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A 500 MW prototype nuclear power station at Kalpakkam, India 
Sagarika Dutt suggests 
that the October 2008 
'deal' has strengthened the 
nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. 
a fn 10 October 2008. India and the 
United States signed the 123 Agreement 
for co-operation between the two coun-
tries in the field of the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy, a few days after President 
Bush had signed the deal into law in the 
United States.1 This was the culmination 
of a process that began over three years 
ago and gave rise to intense diplomatic 
and political debate. "Hie agreement will 
allow India access to nuclear reactors, fuel 
and technologies from the United States 
after a gap of 34 years. Washington had 
terminated nuclear co-operation with 
India back in 1974 after New Delhi had 
conducted a nuclear test in the Pokhran 
desert in Rajasrhan. It makes India the 
only country in the world able to pursue 
civil nuclear trade with other willing na-
tions even though it has not signed the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NTT) 
of 1968. This article explains how this 
'deal' has affected domestic politics in 
India and argues that the issue is not just 
about promoting strategic co-operation 
between the United States and India but 
is also about strengthening the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. 
India has not signed the N P T and the 
Comprehensive Test Ran Treaty (CTBT) 
but has declared a voluntary moratorium 
on nuclear testing. India's nuclear pro-
gramme started in the 1960s. It conduct-
ed nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998 which 
prompted Western countries, including 
the United States, to impose sanctions 
on it. Because of India's 'pariah' status tor 
not signing these treaties its nuclear power 
programme has developed largely without 
fuel or technological assistance from other 
countries. India's nuclear energy self suf-
ficiency extended from uranium explora-
tion and mining through fuel fabrication, 
heavy water production, reactor design 
and construction, to reprocessing anc 
waste management. Nuclear power sup-
plied around 3 per cent of India's electric-
ity in 2007-08, and it is envisaged that 
this will increase to 25 per cent by 2050 
as imported uranium becomes available 
and new plants come on line. India is also 
developing technology to utilise its abun-
dant reserves of thorium, ft is estimated 
that India has 290,000 tonnes of thorium 
reserves, which is about one-quarter of the 
world's total reserves. 
Joint statement 
Co-operation between the United States 
and India in the field oi civilian nuclear 
energy has been a controversial issue right 
from the start. Building on the Next 
Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), a 
process srarred by the BjP government, 
India's present Prime Minister, Manmo-
han Singh, and President George Bush 
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The rapid growth of the Indian economy has prompfed fhe Indian 
government to address fhe issue of energy security. In October 
2008 India and the United States signed the 123 Agreement for 
co-operation in the field of civilian nuclear energy, after three 
years of negotiations. The US-India nuclear deal has given rise 
to controversy in both India and the United States, although for 
different reasons. But the agreement promotes strategic co-
operation between the two countries and also strengthens the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is an on-going concern in 
fhe United States. 
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released a joint statement dated 18 July 
2005. They asserted that 'as leaders ol na-
tions committed to the values of human 
freedom, democracy and the ride of law, 
[he new relationship between India and 
the United States will promote stability, 
democracy, prosperity and peace through-
out the world'. Ibis sweeping statement is 
followed by a further emphasis on their 
'common values and interests', which will 
form the basis of efforts 'to create an inter-
national environment conducive to [the] 
promotion of democratic values' and 'to 
combat terrorism relentlessly'. The state-
ment then gives a list of fields in which 
the two countries will co-operate, ihey 
are the economy; energy and the envi-
ronment; democracy and development; 
non-proliferation and security; and high 
technology and space.1 
A key action point is to support and 
accelerate economic growth in both coun-
tries through greater trade, investment 
and technological] collaboration'. In the 
field of energy and the environment, the 
statement made it clear that the U S - I n -
dia Energy Dialogue would address issues 
such as energy security and sustainable 
development. "The two leaders agreed on 
the need 'to promote the imperatives of 
development and safeguarding the envi-
ronment* and 'commit to developing and 
deploying cleaner, more efficient, afford-
able and diversified energy technologies'. 
Discussions between Bush and Singh 
also addressed the issue of non-prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction, 
and Bush expressed the opinion that 'as 
a responsible state with advanced nuclear 
technology, India should acquire the same 
benefits and advantages as oilier such 
stares'. He also promised that lie would 
work to achieve full civil nuclear energy 
co-operation with India as it pursues its 
goals of promoting nuclear power and 
achieving energy security. 
Presidential undertaking 
In this context the President gave an un-
dertaking to secure the US Congress's 
agreement to adjust US laws and policies 
and also work with 'friends and allies' to 
'adjust' international regimes and address 
the issue o f fuel supplies for safeguarded 
nuclear reactors at Tarapur expeditiously. 
Co-operation between the two countries 
is based on the understanding thai there 
will not be any diversion of nuclear fuel 
M\d technology away from civilian pur-
poses or to third countries without safe-
guards. These understandings were to be 
reflected in a safeguards agreement 10 be 
negotiated bv India with the lnteniaiion.il 
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George Bush 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
'Ihe Indian Prime Minister promised 
thai India would assume the same respon-
sibilities and practices as other countries 
with advanced nuclear technology, such 
as the United States. These would in-
volve identifying and separating civilian 
and military nuclear facilities and pro-
grammes in a phased manner and filing 
a declaration regarding its civilian facili-
ties with the I A E A . I his was considered 
necessary because the Indian nuclear 
power programme began as an undif-
ferentiated programme and the strategic 
programme is an offshoot of this research. 
However. Indian authorities claim that 
'identification of purely civilian facilities 
and programmes that have no strategic 
implications poses a particular challenge', 
and this has necessitated the drafting ol a 
separation plan by the Indian authorities 
that will identify the civilian facilities to 
be offered lor safeguards in phases. 
The range of undertakings made by 
the Indian government included taking 
a decision ro place voluntarily its civilian 
nuclear facilities under I A E A safeguards; 
signing and adhering ro an additional 
protocol wiih respect to civilian nuclear 
facilities; continuing India's unilaier.il 
moratorium on nuclear testing; working 
with the United States for the conclu-
sion o f a multilateral fissile material cut 
off treaty: refraining from the transfer of 
enrichment and reprocessing technolo-
gies to states that do not have them and 
supporting international eflorts to limit 
their spread; and ensuring that necessary 
steps have been taken to secure nuclear 
materials and technology through com-
prehensive export control legislation and 
through haimonis.uion and adherence to 
the Missile Technology Control Regime 
( M T C R ) and Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) guidelines. 
Stiff opposition 
However, the United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA) government faced stiff opposition 
ai home. Tlie Left parries, on whose sup-
pott the U P A government depends, felt 
that the Indo-US Joint Statement was a 
'continuation of the pro-United States 
shift' in Indian foreign policy and a de-
viation from both the policy of non-align-
ment and the Indian government's C o m -
mon M i n i m u m Programme. The C P 1 - M 
polirbureau expressed scepticism about 
the references to spreading democracy 
and combating terrorism and expressed 
its concerns about making alliances with 
die United Stales 'at a time when the su-
perpower has become notorious tor its 
unilateralist and anti-democratic activi-
ties'. The C P I - M was aggrieved that the 
government had not discussed its views 
and proposals with all the parties con-
cerned before deciding on the course ol 
action. The party's leaders felt that the 
present government was continuing the 
'undemocratic practices' of the erstwhile 
National Democratic Alliance ( N D A ) 
regime, which had promoted secret nego-
tiations between Strobe Talbot t and Jas-
wani Singh on security and foreign policy 
issues. 'Ihe C P I - M also made ii very clear 
that it was in favour of an independent 
nuclear policy and pointed out that 'India 
had always opposed the discriminator) 
policies of the nuclear haves and have-
nots... [and] was also committed to nu-
clear disarmament and making the world 
free of nuclear weapons', adding that the 
Rajiv Gandhi plan for disarmament was 
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the last major initiative taken in this 
regard." 
The C P I - M was concerned that 
the United Stares would impose re-
strictions that would hamper the de-
velopment ol an independent Indian 
nuclear technology policv tor peace-
ful purposes and research activities 
tor overcoming, reliance on imported 
nuclear fuel. The C P I - M was also 
unhappy chat the U S administration 
had not recognised India as a nuclear 
weapons power (merely as a state 
with advanced nuclear technology) 
and had not supported its claim for 
a permanent seat in the U N Security 
Council . It asserted that the N D A 
regime had accepted a 'junior partnership" 
with the United States and the much pub-
licised Indo-US Defence Framework was 
based on this asymmetrical partnership. 
It also wanted to know what the United 
States had got in return for offering India 
civilian nuclear co-operation and urt;ed 
the government to clarify whether there 
was an understanding about buying US 
defence equipment to the tune of billions 
of dollars. Ihere may well be a grain of 
truth in these allegations as India has re-
cently stepped up defence collaboration 
with the United Slates. It has recently 
signed 'its biggest-ever military deal' with 
the United States for eight long-range 
maritime reconnaissance aircraft for the 
Indian navy for $2.1 billion and there are 
other plans in the pipeline." 
Further expans ion 
In March 2006, during President Bush's 
visit to India, another joint statement was 
released expressing 'satisfaction with the 
great progress the United Slates and In-
dia have made in advancing our strategic 
partnership to meet the global challenges 
of the 21st century' and the intention to 
'expand even further the growing ties be-
tween [the] two countries'. The joint state-
ment put emphasis on economic prosper-
ity and trade, energy security and a clean 
environment and also global safety and 
security. O n the issue o f nuclear co-opera-
rion the statement 'welcomed the success-
ful completion of discussions on India's 
separation plan' and looked forward ro 
the full implementation o f the commit-
ments made in 2005. It also welcomed the 
participation o f India in the I T E R initia-
tive on fusion energy as an important step 
towards the common goal o f lull nuclear 
energy co-operation. But there were sever-
al anti-American demonstrations during 
Hush's visit, which indicated thai some 
sections of the Indian public did not sup-
Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran 
port American foreign policy and consid-
ered that Bush was not welcome in India. 
In March 2006 the US government 
circulated a statement in the N S G pro-
posing to adjust N S G Guidelines with 
respect to India to enable full civil nuclear 
co-operation.1' But there was consider-
able opposition to the proposed co-op-
eration between the two countries in the 
United States. The nuclear non-prolif-
eration lobby expressed its disapproval of 
the discussions taking place between the 
United States and India and opposed the 
legislation that had been introduced in 
the Congress to amend US laws lo enable 
co-operation between the two countries. 
Critics of the initiative argued that civil-
ian nuclear co-operation with a country 
that has not signed the N P T would seri-
ously undermine it and the global nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. 
Policy defence 
In July 2006, Indian Foreign Secretary 
Shyam Saran defended the India-US 
joint statement o f 18 July 2005. He said 
that 'few other joint statements have been 
dissected in as much detail as this one', 
adding, 'what is so special about the IS 
July joint statement that it warrants an 
analysis even a year later? Is it in any way 
a defining document of our contemporary 
diplomacy? But at the same time, he also 
accepted that it departs from India's 'or-
thodox positions' on importanr issues.s A l -
though not mentioning India's traditional 
policy of non-alignment, Saran admitted 
that the era ol defensive diplomacy was 
over. 'If India is to become a credible can-
didare lor permanent membership of the 
Security Counci l , then we must adjust our 
traditional positions. Our foreign policy 
must reflect our national aspirations and 
express out confidence as an emerging 
global player'. He pointed out that Ameri-
can strategic assessments oi India articu-
lated in the National Securin 
Strategy o f March 2006 ant 
the Quadrennial Dcfena 
Review Report of Februan 
2006 describe India as a ma-
jor power shouldering global 
obligations and as a key actor, 
along with China and Russia, 
in determining the interna-
tional security environment 
for the 21st eenturv. 
It seems that non-align-
ment is becoming an obso-
lete concept as the Indian 
economy is expanding and 
economic considerations are 
beginning to outweigh all 
other considerations. Better relations with 
the United States is in India's national in-
terest. The United States is India's largest 
trading partner, an important investor in 
the Indian economy and source of tech-
nology. Improved ties with the United 
States could accelerate India's growth 
rate and the process o f development. For 
the United States, India is currently one 
of the fastest growing export markets. 
Both countries realise that a technological 
partnership with the United States would 
enormously benefit a country like India, 
whose future is so tied to the knowledge 
and service industries. The Americans 
also have respect for Indian democracy, 
and the two countries have similar stands 
on terrorism and securin' threats from 
non-state actors. 
Pre-eminent power 
In the field of international relations, the 
Indians consider the United States to be 
the pre-eminent power of our times' that 
can shape global opinion in India's favour. 
India 'requires adjustments in the inter-
national order so that [its] aspirations are 
accommodated'. Saran believes that "the 
challenge to Indian diplomacy... is ro 
maximise the gains while minimising the 
costs, and create an international environ-
ment that is supportive of firs] develop-
mental goals'. India needs to overcome rhe 
factors that are hampering the growth o f 
the Indian economy. These factors include 
inadequate infrastructure and energy se-
curity. 
The dialogue with the United States is 
addressing these problems. For example, 
as a result of post-18 July discussions. India 
has been able to finalise Indian participa-
tion in the FutureGen initiative, dealing 
with clean coal, and the Integrated Ocean 
Dril l ing Programme, dealing with gas 
hydrates. The joint statement ol 18 July 
ha- also enabled Indian participation in 
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the I T E R fusion energy 
initiative. India has now 
joined a select group or 
countries (the European 
Union, France, Russia, 
China , japan and South 
Korea) to collaborate in 
an area that will benefit 
India enormously." 
Limited access 
A structurally disadvan-
taged Indian government 
feels that technology de-
nial regimes, led by the 
United Stares and other 
advanced countries, need 
to be dismantled. India's 
access to nuclear technol-
ogy and equipment was 
limited after 1974 on the 
grounds that most ad-
vanced nuclear technolo-
gies have dual uses. A p -
parently, in the 1980s a 
Cray super-computer for 
better weather forecast-
ing was denied to India, 
since it could conceivably 
be used in its nuclear pro-
gramme as well. While 
India's nuclear isolation 
had encouraged indig-
enous innovation and led 
to outstanding achieve-
ments by Indian scientists in the past, an 
increasingly globalised and competitive 
world demands a different response to-
day. As the Indian economy matures, and 
the country moves towards an ever more 
sophisticated knowledge and Technology 
driven society, more co-operation is need-
ed with other countries. This w i l l also cre-
ate opportunities for Indian scientists and 
technologists to benefit from regular inter-
action with their counterparts in the rest 
of the world. But the Indian government 
has also made very clear that it would not 
agree to any restrictions on India's strate-
gic programme, nor does it expect any as-
sistance from its international partners. 
While the US government was con-
sidering amendments to US laws to enable 
full civil nuclear energy co-operation with 
India, the 18 July 2005 joint Statement 
and the Separation Plan were tabled in the 
Indian Parliament by the Prime Minister 
on 7 March 2006. The final version of the 
Separation Plan was presented to Parlia-
ment on II May 2006. l i t is plan con-
tained a schedule for placing India's nu-
clear reactors under safeguards beginning 
from 2007. lhe Indian Prime Minister 
R.S. Sharma, chairman of India's largest power utility, NTPC, and 
Dr S.K. Jain, chairman of the National Power Corporation of India, 
sign an agreement in Mumbai on 14 February 2009 to set up 
nuclear power plants. Below: they exchange texts 
also made a statement in the Rajya Sabha 
on 17 August and in the Lok Sabha on 23 
August 2006 that emphasised that 'any-
thing that went beyond the parameters 
of the July 18 Joint Statement would be 
unacceptable to India' and that India will 
not place its nuclear facilities under safe-
guards until all restrictions on India are 
lifted'.1" In an interview with India Today, 
the Prime Minister argued that nuclear 
power is critical to India's energy security 
' i f we want to be a world power'. He also 
expressed faith in President Bush, who. in 
his opinion, of all the US presidents has 
shown the greatest friendliness towards 
India. Based on a recent foreign policy re-
view, the Indian government has come to 
the conclusion that in a globalised world 
relations with the United States need to be 
given the highest importance.11 
Waiver grant 
Meanwhile, the Henry J . Hyde United 
Stales-India Peaceful Atomic Energy C o -
operation Act of 2006. belter known as 
the Hyde Act. was passed by both houses 
of the US Congress in December 2006. 
Its purpose was to grant the US adminis-
tration a waiver from Sec-
tion 123 of the Atomic En-
ergy Act o f 1954 to enable 
the US administration to 
resume nuclear commerce 
with India. The text o f this 
Act makes it very clear that 
t is based on the principle of 
nuclear non-proliferation. 
t begins with the statement 
that 'It is the sense of Con-
that... preventing 
the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, other weapons 
of mass destruction, the 
means to produce them, 
and the means to deliver 
them are critical objectives 
for United States foreign 
policy' and goes on to say 
that 'sustaining the Nucle-
ar Non-Proliferation Treaty 
( N P V) and strengthening 
its implementation ... is the 
keystone o f United States 
non-proliferation policy'. 
The Act categorically states 
that 
any commerce in civil 
nuclear energy with 
India by the United 
States and other coun-
tries must be achieved 
:
 ' • in a manner that mini-
mizes the risk of nucle-
ar proliferation or regional arms races 
and maximises India's adherence to 
international non-proliferation re-
gimes, including, in particular, the 
guidelines o f the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG). 
Under section 104 of the Act. the US Pres-
ident is required to report to appropriate 
Congressional committees on the progress 
made by India in discharging its obliga-
tions as identified by rhe Act. Amongst 
other things, the Presidenr is asked to 
provide 'a description of the steps taken to 
ensure that proposed United States civil 
nuclear co-operation with India will not 
in any way assist India's nuclear weapons 
program'. Most crucially, he must provide 
'a description of the steps that India is tak-
ing to work with the United States for the 
conclusion of a multilateral treaty ban-
ning the production of fissile material for 
nuclear weapons', as well as the steps the 
{ S government is taking to encourage In-
dia to declare a date by which India would 
be will ing to stop production ol fissile ma-
terial for nuclear weapons unilaterally or 
pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or 
treaty. 
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Important regime 
I be nuclear non-proliferation regime 
is one of the most important regimes in 
international relations today. The N P T 
at 1968, which prohibits nuclear weapon 
states from transferring nuclear weapons 
to non-nuclear weapon states and from 
assisting or encouraging them to acquire 
nuclear weapons, is the cornerstone of 
this international regime. However, India 
has always maintained that this treaty is 
discriminatory. The definition of regimes 
as sets of implicit or explicit 'principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making pro-
cedures around which actor expectations 
converge in a given issue-area*12 creates 
the impression that regimes are based on 
a consensus. In reality they are often the 
product of difficult and intense negotia-
tions and bargaining, that lead to critical 
compromises among the negotiating par-
ties." Furthermore, the possibility o f chal-
lenges to existing regimes cannot be ruled 
out as India's stance and move recently 
Iran's nuclear policy have shown. 
Ironically, the Act asks the US ad-
ministration to 'secure India's full and 
active participation in United States ef-
forts to dissuade, isolate, and i( necessary, 
sanction and contain Iran for its efforts 
to acquire weapons o f mass destruction-
International regimes are not static; they 
evolve and with the passage of time may 
become less consistent internally. A critic 
of regime analysis points out that inter-
ests and power relationships are the prox-
imate and not just the ultimate cause o f 
behaviour in the international system.1'1 
This is the reason there has been so much 
opposition to the nuclear deal between 
India and the United States in Indian po-
litical circles. 
123 agreement 
In mid-2007 an agreement for co-opera-
tion between the Indian and US govern-
ments concerning the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy, also known as the 123 
Agreement, was finalised. In the carefully 
negotiared text the two parties recognise 
the significance of civilian nuclear energy 
tor meeiing growing energy demands in 
a cleaner and more efficient manner.' It 
emphasises the importance of achieving 
energy security 'on a stable, reliable and 
predictable basis'. Whi le this and strength-
ening the strategic partnership between 
the two countries are the main purpose ol 
the agreement, the focus is equally on the 
prevention of the proliferation ol weapons 
of mass destruction and support for the 
objectives of the I A E A and the safeguards 
svsrem. 
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However, the agreement does not 
'hinder or otherwise interfere with any 
other activities involving the use of nu-
clear material, non-nuclear material, 
equipment, components, information or 
technology and military nuclear facilities 
produced, acquired or developed by them 
independent of this agreement for their 
own purposes'. Indian political elites felt 
that the 123 Agreement was more favour-
able to them than the Hyde Act. 
Oppos i t ion chal lenge 
In July 2008 opposition parties attempted 
to bring Manmohan Singh's government 
down. A i l o f these parties are completely 
against the nuclear deal for reasons that 
will be explained below. The opposition 
even accused the government ol bribing 
M P s to vote in its favour. After some dra-
matic scenes in the Lok Sabha, the gov-
ernment won the vote of confidence on 22 
July. A triumphant Prime Minister hit out 
at his political opponents and accused the 
BJP supremo, L . K . Advani, of promoting 
communal violence and the Left parties 
of trying to exercise a veto over govern-
ment decision-making. He reiterated that 
the agreement with the Unired States 
would end India's isolation and enable it 
to trade with the United States, Russia, 
France and other countries but without 
any external political interference in the 
nations strategic nuclear programme. 
Attempting to assuage his political oppo-
nents' tears, the Prime Minister asserted 
that India's strategic autonomy will never 
be compromised. 
But Prakash Karat, the C P 1 - M Gener-
al Secretary, insisted that the nuclear deal 
was 'against the interest of the country 
and vowed that the ' C P I - M will continue 
the struggle against the Indo-US nuclear 
deal."' He believes that "to make India's 
foreign policy and strategic autonomy 
hostage to the potential benefits ol nuclear 
energy does not make sense except for the 
American imperative to bind India to its 
strategic design in Asia'.1" However, the 
Prime Minister emerged victorious from 
this fracas and his government proceeded 
ro seek the blessings of the I A E A . O n 1 
August the 35-member I A E A Board of 
Governors unanimously approved an In-
dia-specific safeguards agreement.1 [here-
after, following weeks o f speculation, 
nervousness and uncertainty in India, the 
45-nation N S G granted a waiver to India 
on 6 September allowing it to participate 
in global nuclear commerce, and ending 
34 years of India's nuclear isolation. 
Voluntary morator ium 
Hie N'SG's deliberations had taken longer 
than anticipated as several countries (Chi-
na. Austria, Ireland and N e w Zealand) 
bad expressed reservations. However, 
while India's External Affairs minister, 
Pranab Mukherjee, was trying to con-
vince the N S G that India would continue 
to observe a voluntary moratorium on nu-
clear testing, that it had a no-first use nu-
clear weapons policy and that 'India has a 
long-standing and steadfast commitment 
to universal, non-discriminatory and total 
elimination of nuclear weapons', ar home 
the U P A government insisted that India 
retains sovereign rights to conduct nuclear 
tests. This vvas echoed by the US Ambas-
sador to India, David Mulford,'* and also 
by India's Former President Kalam, who 
asserted, in an interview with N D T V in 
September 2008, that India will always 
have the right to test in the supreme na-
tional interest. But both the 1 lyde Act and 
the 123 Agreement make it very cleat that 
if India did go down this road it might 
have to pay a heavy price. 
Wirh a new administration in office 
in the United States, the Indian govern-
ment can no longer count on their special 
friendship with George Bush. Moreover 
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President Obama, who had nor initially 
supported the 123 Agreement and as 
a senator had attempted to amend the 
I iyde Act,'' has already made it very clear 
that non-proliferation and the reduction 
of nuclear weapons will be one of his key 
aims and he wants a deal with Russia to 
achieve this.-'" As American security ex-
pert Ronald Lehman says, the agreement 
between the United States and India is 'an 
opportunity to strengthen a nuclear non-
proliferation regime that is suffering trom 
its own internal weaknesses' such as in-
adequate enforcement and an inability to 
engage effectively the non-parties to the 
NPT. Bringing India into a more com-
prehensive regime of nuclear non-prolif-
;ration would help to reduce the dangers 
issociated with weapons of mass destruc-
ion."1 China, too. was integrated into the 
ion-proliferation regime as a stakeholder 
vhen it was admitted into the NSC and 
vas allowed to conduct nuclear com-
nerce under safeguards.J: But political 
onsiderarions should not make us lose 
tght of the fact that the Indian nation 
ieeds nuclear power. With a population 
f over 1.2 billion and a rapidly expand-
ig economy, India is struggling to meet 
s energy demands and cannot afford to 
more the nuclear option. 
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